Spi2Java: Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Java Code Generation from spi calculus

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Abstract

The aim of this work is to describe a tool (Spi2Java) that automatically generates Java code implementing cryptographic protocols described in the formal specification language spi calculus. Spi2Java is part of a set of tools for spi calculus, also including a pre-processor, a parser, and a security analyzer. The latter can formally analyze protocols and detect protocol flaws. When a protocol has been analyzed and an adequate confidence about its correctness has been reached, Spi2Java can generate a corresponding correct Java implementation of the protocol, thus dramatically reducing the risk of introducing security flaws in the coding phase.

1 Introduction

One of the most challenging practical problems in modern computer science is how to ensure design and implementation correctness of security protocols. The role of such protocols is to achieve security goals such as authentication, confidentiality and integrity, by using cryptography. For this reason they are also called cryptographic protocols.

Recently, many research efforts have been dedicated to the problem of analyzing the logical correctness of cryptographic protocols (e.g.[3][2][6][7][11]), whereas the implementation correctness problem has not yet been considered so much. One of the possible approaches to ensure implementation correctness is to produce implementations automatically from formal specifications [7][12][9]. If the code generator is such that the generated code faithfully implements the specification and avoids programming errors that can lead to security breaches, implementation correctness is achieved. Therefore, if the source specification is logically correct, so is the implementation. In this paper we show how this approach can be put into practice in a framework where the target code language is Java and cryptographic protocols are specified in spi calculus [1], a process algebraic specification language specifically tailored for such protocols.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces spi calculus, section 3 presents the architecture of Spi2Java, and sections 4-7 describe its components. Section 8 gives some experimental results, section 9 discusses related work, and section 10 concludes.

2 Spi calculus

The spi calculus is defined in [1] as an extension of the π calculus [8] with cryptographic primitives. It is a process algebraic language designed for describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols. The spi calculus has two basic language elements: terms, to represent data, and processes, to represent behaviors. In this paper we present only some features of spi calculus, through an example, due to the limited space. Fig. 1 shows the spi calculus[1] specification of the *Andrew*[5] key exchange protocol.

The specification is composed of two process descriptions named `pA` and `pB`, which represent the two roles of the protocol. The `Inst` process represents the interaction scenario where an instance of `pA` and an instance of `pB` run concurrently. The initiator role process `pA` and the `Inst` process are parameterized by `M`, which is the data that must be sent. `M` occurs explicitly as a parameter, because this is required by the security analysis tool [3]. In contrast, the other protocol parameters are all implicit.

The left column of Fig. 1 shows the exchanged messages using the informal, intuitive representation often encountered in the literature, where $\mathtt{A} \rightarrow \mathtt{B} : \sigma$ means that `A` sends

[1] Spi2Java uses some typographic conventions respect to the original spi calculus

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A->B: A,Na	pA(M):= (@Na) cAB<A,Na>.	pB():= cAB(xA,xNa).
B->A: {(Na,k1AB)}kAB	cAB(xMSG). (@KeyStore) KeyStore<B>. KeyStore(kAB). case xMSG of {xNa,xk1AB}kAB in [xNa is Na]	(@KeyStore) KeyStore<xA>. KeyStore(kAB). (@k1AB) cAB<{xNa,k1AB}kAB>.
A->B: {Na}k1AB	cAB<{Na}xk1AB>.	cAB(xMSGcypher). case xMSGcypher of {xnewNa}k1AB in [xnewNa is xNa] KeyStore<xA,k1AB>.
B->A: Nb	cAB(dummy). KeyStore<B,xk1AB>.	(@Nb) cAB<Nb>.
A->B: {M}k1AB	cAB<{M}xk1AB>.0	cAB(Mcypher). case Mcypher of {x}k1AB in 0
Inst(M):=(pA(M)|pB())		

Figure 1. The Andrew Protocol spi calculus specification

message σ to B. The central column shows the spi calculus specification for process pA, whereas the right column shows the behavior of process pB.

The Andrew protocol assumes that each process has a local key store where symmetric keys are stored. Since the key store explicitly partakes in the protocol, it must be modelled in spi calculus. Our simple modelling strategy is to represent the key store as a separate process (not shown in Fig. 1) that interacts with the corresponding protocol principal through a dedicated communication channel (the *KeyStore channel*). The operations of getting and storing a key are modelled as inputs and outputs on the key store channel respectively. More precisely, a key is stored in the key store under an alias, which permits its unique identification. So, the operation of retrieving a stored key is represented by the statements $\texttt{KeyStore} < \texttt{xA} > .\texttt{KeyStore}(\texttt{kAB})$ where KeyStore denotes the interaction channel, xA is the alias and kAB is the variable where the key extracted from the key store is saved. The corresponding storing operation is described by the statement $\texttt{KeyStore} < \texttt{xA}, \texttt{k1AB} >$ where k1AB is the key that must be stored under the alias xA. Note that the visibility of the KeyStore term is restricted with the @ operator, so it is considered private for the process. In a run of the Andrew protocol, five messages are exchanged between pA and pB over channel cAB: **1)**pA sends pB its identifier A and Nonce Na. pB receives the message and stores the two fields in variables xA and xNa respectively. **2)**pB retrieves key kAB, shared with pA, from its local KeyStore and builds a new fresh key k1AB, that together with xNa is encrypted with kAB and the result is sent to pA. pA receives the message and decrypts it by means of kAB retrieved from its local Key Store. The two fields of the computed cleartext (Na and k1AB) are stored in xNa and xK1AB and the match between the value of Na and xNa is checked.



Figure 2. The Spi2Java Program Architecture

3)pA sends pB the nonce Na encrypted with the shared key k1AB. pB decrypts the message and checks the match between the received nonce xnewNa and xNa. Then pB stores k1AB under the alias A in its local KeyStore, thus overwriting kAB. **4)**pB sends pA a fresh nonce Nb. pA receives the nonce and replaces kAB with k1AB in its local KeyStore. Now the key is fully agreed. **5)**pA uses k1AB to encrypt the secret message M and sends it to pB. pB receives the encrypted message, decrypts it and stores M in variable x.

3 The Tool Architecture

The generated code is organized as one independent program for each protocol role, and such programs can be activated at need whenever a new session of the protocol must be executed. Therefore, Spi2Java generates a single protocol role at a time (like pA of Fig. 1). Processes that specify only particular instantiation scenarios of protocol sessions (like Inst of Fig. 1) are not relevant and are ignored during code generation.

The Spi2Java program is composed of two modules: a *Term Typer and Description Checker* and an *Automatic Generator of Java Code*. The generated code is based on Java library modules implementing, in a configurable way, the elementary operations that can occur in spi calculus descriptions. Fig. 2 shows the dataflow for the whole tool architecture.

4 The Term Typer and Description Checker

Spi calculus is not typed, so the *Term Typer and Description Checker* is responsible to fill the information gap between protocol specification and implementation for what concerns data types. In particular, this functional block automatically checks whether term variables are used consistently within a protocol role process and, if this check is positive, automatically assigns concrete Java types to term



Figure 3. The term type class hierarchy

variables. Term type assignments are performed by an algorithm that associates any term variable with the most specialized Java class that safely represents it. The user can manually enforce more specialized types for certain variables by means of the *Specification* file, which is read and interpreted by this module. Manually specifying a more specialized type is possible but not necessary. For example, if a process does not perform any operation on a term except sending it out, the Message type is perfectly appropriate for that term.

We use a class hierarchy organized on three specialization levels (Fig. 3 shows only some of the classes, due to the limited space, although Spi2Java deals with all the spi calculus features) for those terms that could be sent over channels and another simple hierarchy for communication channels, since channel classes depend on the applied Transport Library and on the process role (client/server). So a term is typed as **Channel** when it is a generic communication channel used to send/receive messages or as **KeyStore** which is a possible specialization of Channel, when it represents the access point to a local key store where keys and/or digital certificates are stored. Here is a brief description of the meaning of term classes shown in Fig. 3. **Message** is the less specialized type, because it represents any message. A term is typed as Message whenever the algorithm is not able to determine a more specialized type for it. **Name** is a partially specialized type that represents any non-structured spi calculus term (i.e. a spi calculus name). Name is implemented by a class that cannot be instantiated, because objects of this class are always objects of more specialized concrete classes. A Name can be any level 3 class object but it can even be an object of a new user-defined derived class. **ChannelId** represents a channel identifier. It is useful for sending over an existing channel the information for opening a new communication channel with a server role. **SharedKeyT** represents a key for use with symmetric cryptosystems. **NonceT** represents a randomly chosen sequence of bits. **Identifier** represents some information which identifies an entity in a unique way. For example, it can be used as an alias to identify a key stored inside a KeyStore. **HashT** represents the result of applying a cryptographic hash function on some data **SharedKeyCiphered** represents the result of a symmetric cryptographic operation on some data. The operation can be either an encryption or a decryption. **PairT** represents a container of a couple of objects that can be of heterogeneous types. A tuple of objects is translated, inside the program, into nested Pair objects.

5 The SecureClasses Library

The *SecureClasses* security library provides a set of classes that implement in a flexible and configurable way all the elementary data types and cryptographic operations that can be abstractly expressed in spi calculus. This library acts as a general interface toward security providers, which are responsible to provide the concrete implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The providers used to test *SecureClasses* and the generated code are those by *SUN*[2] and *IAIK*[3]. This library heavily relies on Java Serialization to build data packets to be sent on communication channels and/or to be encrypted. The *SecureClasses* library has been designed with special care, pursuing several goals: **1)** There is a strict correspondence whereby each spi calculus term corresponds to a Java class in the *SecureClasses* library as shown in Fig. 3. Note that each spi calculus statement corresponds to a simple Java construct calling a method in one of the term objects. **2)**Classes and methods hide the internal complexity of the cryptographic algorithms behavior and management. **3)**The user is able (by means of a special class where constants can be modified) to customize the internal behavior of classes, choosing the security provider, the algorithm and the related parameters for each different kind of cryptographic operation. **4)**Attention has been paid to achieve efficiency of the generated code, thanks to the efficiency of the classes implementation. **5)**Each class implementation has been kept as close as possible to its abstract model, and programming errors that can lead to known security breaches have been avoided. Note that a complete adherence is not achievable since the used cryptography is not perfect. In fact the implementations of cryptographic operations can only approximate the idealized behavior of cryptographic algorithms. For example, assuming perfect cryptographic conditions (perfect encryption) the hashes of different messages never collide.

6 The Transport Layer Interface

The *SecureClasses* library includes three interfaces named *ChannelId* to represent a channel identifier, *ChannelT* to represent a generic client/server communication

[2]The SUN-JCE provider is furnished as extension with the JCE 1.2.x or included inside the JDK 1.4, it is available at http://java.sun.com

[3]The IAIK-JCE provider is a product of IAIK, it is available at http://www.iaik.tugraz.at

channel, and *ServerT* to represent the generic server process waiting for incoming client requests. All these classes are the interaction point with the Transport Layer Library that is used. In this way, transport layer independence is achieved for the generated code. The user can specify it by means of the *Specification* file.

The transport layer classes hide transport layer management and enable the direct translation of any spi calculus input/output operation into proper Java code.

7 The Java Code Automatic Generator

The Java automatic generator provides the Java implementation of the protocol role described in spi calculus and is partially guided by the *Specification* file, where the user can specify several implementation choices, such as for example which role (client/server) must be assigned to a spi calculus process, what terms are return parameters and what transport layer library must be used. The generated code uses classes and methods provided by the *it.polito.SecureClasses* and by the Transport Library module that has been chosen.

Starting from a spi calculus specification, and the related *Specification* file, the Code Generator writes the Java protocol implementation class on the *Protocol* file. The Code Generator also produces an application skeleton (on the *Application* file) and some other class files useful to launch the client application/server, since the user will typically use the protocol handshake as a prelude of a target application.

The Protocol file is generated by syntax directed translation of the spi calculus behavior expression. More precisely the spi calculus syntax tree is visited and for each spi calculus operation, the Java code that implements it is generated, preceded by a description comment. The latter enhances code readability and makes the correspondence with the spi calculus specification visible. Fig. 4 shows the most interesting piece of code generated in the Protocol file for the `pA` process of the Andrew protocol. Return objects are retrievable by the method `getReturnParameter(inti)` (not shown here). `ClassCastExceptions` are generated when a wrong cast happens. This may happen during message receive and deserialization operations.

```
1:public class andrewPA_Protocol {
2:
3:/* Object containing Return Parameters */
4:private Message retPar;
5:
6:/* The number of Return Parameters */
7:private int nPar;
8:
9:public andrewPA_Protocol ( Message M_1, IdentifierT A_0, IdentifierT B_0,
10:       TcpIpClientChannel cAB_0, LoadKeyStore KeyStore_5)throws ProtocolException {
11:   try {
12:
13:     /* cAB_0<(A_0,Na_2)> */
14:     NonceT Na_2 = new NonceT();
15:     PairT Pair__A_0__Na_2 = new PairT(A_0, Na_2);
16:     cAB_0.Send( Pair__A_0__Na_2 );
17:
18:     /* cAB_0(xMSG_4) */
19:     SharedKeyCiphered xMSG_4 = (SharedKeyCiphered) cAB_0.Receive();
20:
21:     /* KeyStore_5<B_0>
22:        KeyStore_5(kAB_7) */
23:     PasswordManager pm0 = new ConstantPassword();
24:     SharedKeyT kAB_7 = new SharedKeyT(B_0.getIdentifier(), KeyStore_5.getKeyStore(), pm0);
25:
26:     /* case xMSG_4 of {_w0_8}kAB_7 in */
27:     SharedKeyCiphered _w0_8 = new SharedKeyCiphered(xMSG_4.getEncoded(), kAB_7,
28:                               Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, xMSG_4.getIV() );
29:
30:     /* let (xNa_9,xklAB_9) = _w0_8 in */
31:     PairT Pair__xNa_9__xklAB_9 = (PairT) DeserializeT.getDeserializeT( _w0_8.getEncoded() );
32:     NonceT xNa_9 = ( NonceT ) Pair__xNa_9__xklAB_9.getFirst();
33:     SharedKeyT xklAB_9 = ( SharedKeyT ) Pair__xNa_9__xklAB_9.getSecond();
34:
35:     /* [xNa_9 is Na_2] */
36:     if( !xNa_9.isEqual( Na_2 ) )
37:       throw new ProtocolException("Match test is false!");
38:
39:     /* cAB_0<(Na_2}xklAB_9> */
40:     SharedKeyCiphered Na_2_SharedKeyCiphered_xklAB_9 = new SharedKeyCiphered(
41:                 SerializeT.getSerializeT( Na_2 ), xklAB_9, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, null );
42:     cAB_0.Send( Na_2_SharedKeyCiphered_xklAB_9 );
43:
44:     /* cAB_0(dummy_12) */
45:     Message dummy_12 = ( Message ) cAB_0.Receive();
46:
47:     /* KeyStore_5<(B_0,xklAB_9)> */
48:     PasswordManager pm1 = new ConstantPassword();
49:     xklAB_9.addToKeyStore( B_0.getIdentifier(), KeyStore_5.getKeyStore(), true , pm1 );
50:
51:     /* cAB_0<(M_1}xklAB_9> */
52:     SharedKeyCiphered M_1_SharedKeyCiphered_xklAB_9 = new SharedKeyCiphered(
53:                 SerializeT.getSerializeT( M_1 ), xklAB_9, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, null );
54:     cAB_0.Send( M_1_SharedKeyCiphered_xklAB_9 );
55:
56:     /* Build the container, for the objects we have to return. */
57:     nPar = 1;
58:     retPar = ( SharedKeyT )xklAB_9;
59:
60:   } catch( java.lang.ClassCastException cce ) {
61:     throw new ProtocolException("An unexpected object has been received belonging to
62:                                  class: " + cce.getMessage() );
63:   }
64:
65: }
```

Figure 4. The Andrew pA Protocol code

7.1 Generated Java Code Characteristics

Spi2Java is coupled with a protocol analyzer [3] that can detect design protocol flaws on spi calculus specifications. Using the analyzer, a reasonable confidence about the logical correctness of the specified protocols can be reached. The main objective of Spi2Java is to derive protocol implementations that are as faithful as possible to the original formal protocol specification that has been analyzed. This is achieved by performing a syntax driven translation where there is a one to one correspondence between each spi calculus description element and a Java code fragment that implements it. More precisely, a mapping is established from spi calculus behavior expressions to behavior logics that use classes of the *SecureClasses* library and from spi calculus terms to classes of the *SecureClasses* library. This strategy guarantees that the generated code structure reflects the same structure of the original specification, ruling out human errors that are possible if coding is done by hand.

It is worth noting that spi calculus, differently from other specification formalisms for cryptographic protocols that describe only the exchanged messages, also enables precise specifications of all the checks that must be performed by the protocol roles. Accordingly, the resulting implementation includes exactly the specified checks, rather than any possible check, as it would be needed starting from other specification formalisms and using a conservative approach.

It is also worth noting that the protocol security analyzer [3] models any cryptographic operation in an idealized way (perfect encryption). Therefore, even if a protocol has been shown correct from a logical point of view, it cannot be implemented maintaining exactly the same semantics, so, it is not possible, in general, to formally guarantee that the generated code behaves *exactly* as its formal protocol specification. Nevertheless, even if it is impossible to achieve perfect encryption, it is still possible to draw near it. In fact it is possible to change both security providers and algorithms for any kind of cryptographic operation allowing the user to select implementations that best match the perfect encryption assumption. This capability also gives the chance to easily substitute an algorithm implementation that is affected by an error, immediately as soon as it is discovered.

Let us consider now immunity of the generated code from breaches due to programming errors. Since the generated code is simply a sequence of calls of methods from the (*SecureClasses* and *TcpIpLayer*) libraries, it is enough to achieve a high confidence about immunity of such libraries from breaches due to programming errors. In order to achieve this, the libraries have been carefully developed and have been extensively tested. Furthermore, the implementation of our libraries, and then of the protocol, is secure against the following kinds of implementation weaknesses: **Buffer overruns** because the adopted implementation language is Java [15][4], which cannot be affected by this kind of attacks (except for overflows in the JVM itself). In fact Java uses the following to safeguard the memory: array bounds are checked for each array access; there are no pointers, memory is managed by reference (pointers are one of the most bug-prone aspects of C and C++); object casting is restricted (necessary to ensure type safety); variables cannot be used before they are initialized (another memory-protection mechanism); garbage collection automatically frees memory (avoiding memory deallocation errors). **Type flaws** that occur when a message is interpreted in an incorrect form, because all messages are typed and code always checks type inconsistencies and raises an exception when a mismatch occurs. Moreover note that in our implementation all messages are serialized, so the deserialization mechanism fails and raises an exception if a type flaw occurs. **False input attacks** because they rely on unchecked input parameters, whereas checks on objects are already specified in the spi calculus description, and their specification correctness is verified by the security analyzer program [3]. Moreover the implementation of our classes provides all the necessary checks and generates an exception whenever a constraint is violated.

In conclusion, an overall high confidence about non-vulnerability of the protocol implementation can be reached. Moreover, the code is highly configurable, since the user can independently select the security provider, the cryptographic algorithms and their parameters. At the same time, the protocol code implementation is optimized in the sense that each object is created only when it is really needed: this means that at each time all live objects are only those strictly needed.

8 Testing and experiments

We have tested the *it.polito.SecureClasses* library using all the features supported by the *IAIK*[4] and *SUN*[5] providers. Moreover we have tested *Spi2Java* using several simple ad-hoc protocol examples and some real known protocols: *Andrew*, *KSL*, *SSL*, *Needham-Schroeder*.

9 Related work

In the last years some tools have been developed to specify, design, verify and implement cryptographic protocols. While a lot of papers address protocol verification, only some address automatic code generation [7] [12] [9].

We have chosen Java as the target language for protocol implementation, as in [7] [12] [9], due to the language excellent security architecture and resistance to common security attacks [15] [4].

The choice of spi calculus as the language for protocol specification gives some advantages with respect to previous works, because it allows to explicitly specify which checks the protocol must perform. This implies that the code generator, knowing what kind of controls must be implemented, can avoid to generate controls that are not required, thus producing an optimized protocol code. All the other tools [7] [12] [9], starting from protocols specified by means of formal languages without the above feature, must always implement all the possible checks. Moreover, all the other tools [7] [12] [9] require that each term type is explicitly specified, while our tool is able to understand the correct type of terms in an automatic way, directly in almost all cases.

Cryptographic Code Generation From CAPSL [9] starts from the *CAPSL* or *CIL* specification languages. The produced code includes a demonstration environment, useful to view the protocol behavior, that shall be removed or modified for a direct use in application environments. This environment represents the ”man in the middle” attack, so it receives all messages exchanged between parties showing protocol handshakes. Our code does not contain a demonstration environment, but we can add such a feature in the transport layer directly (building a new transport library),

[4]The IAIK-JCE provider is a product of IAIK, it is available at http://www.iaik.tugraz.at

[5]The *SUN-JCE* provider is furnished as extension with the *JCE* 1.2.x or included inside the *JDK* 1.4, it is available at http://java.sun.com

thus allowing the redirection of messages towards a demonstration application able to behave as an attacker. Moreover in [9] the generated code is inefficient because it runs by interpreting an abstract data structure. A further limitation is the dependence of key objects on cryptographic algorithms, which are fixed as DES for symmetric operations. Another limitation is the absence of public encryption which is substituted in the code by a dummy encryption operation.

The *AGVI* [12] tool generates code using the same protocol description taken by the protocol analyzer *Athena* [11]. [12] contains few information about code generation and implementation. Such information is probably reported in [10], which, however, is not reachable on the web.

SPEAR II [7] provides code generation from an abstract protocol specification in the *GYPSIE* [13] environment, while parameters and settings for code generation are specified in the graphical *GENIE* [14] environment. The produced code is based on *Cryptix*[6] and *Crypto-J*[7] cryptographic libraries. A good feature of [7] is that it uses the accepted standard *ASN.1* for describing messages, thus allowing the generated code to communicate with other non-SPEAR II implementations.

All the above projects [7] [12] [9] generate a code that is not *Java-Security-Provider*-independent as ours. Provider independence is a good feature, because if a security flaw is found in a specific library, it is possible to replace the security provider with another one, unaffected by the problem, without modifying the generated code. Only the code produced by *SPEAR II* [7] is Transport Layer independent and translates from protocol specification to code implementation directly, as we do.

10 Conclusions

A new automatic Java code generator for cryptographic protocols specified in spi calculus has been developed, to be integrated in a specification and verification environment for security protocols. Spi2Java provides the protocol implementation together with a skeleton code, useful to develop an application that uses the protocol.

Spi2Java has a module that associates a type to each spi calculus term in an automatic or semi-automatic way and checks for abstract description incongruities.

With the *SecureClasses* library, we have been able to hide the complexity of the cryptographic algorithms and offer maximum flexibility, allowing the choice of a Security Provider, an algorithm and the algorithm parameters for each kind of cryptographic operation. Moreover, a strict correspondence between spi calculus objects and classes allows us to guarantee a high confidence level about code correctness. The definition of Transport Layers as modules allows the user to choose and replace the transport protocol in an easy way.

The produced Java code optimizes the creation time of needed object, avoids common implementation attacks and maintains an high understandability thanks to the presence of comments before each behavior expression.

[6]The Cryptix library is available from http://www.cryptix.org

[7]The Crypto-J library is an RSA product, it can be obtained form http://www.rsa.com

11 Ackonwledgment

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